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Abstract. One of the main issues in digital forensics is the management
of evidences. From the time of evidence collection until the time of their
exploitation in a legal court, evidences may be accessed by multiple par-
ties involved in the investigation that take temporary their ownership.
This process, called Chain of Custody (CoC), must ensure that evidences
are not altered during the investigation, despite multiple entities owned
them, in order to be admissible in a legal court. Currently digital evi-
dences CoC is managed entirely manually with entities involved in the
chain required to fill in documents accompanying the evidence. In this
paper, we propose a Blockchain-based Chain of Custody (B-CoC) to de-
materialize the CoC process guaranteeing auditable integrity of the col-
lected evidences and traceability of owners. We developed a prototype of
B-CoC based on Ethereum and we evaluated its performance.
Keywords: Digital Forensics · Chain of Custody · Digital Evidence ·
Private Blockchain · Ethereum.
1 Introduction
One of the main issues in digital forensics is the management of evidences. From
the time of evidence collection until the time of their exploitation in a legal
court, evidences may be accessed by multiple parties involved in the investiga-
tion that take temporarily their ownership. The Chain of Custody is the process
of validating how any kind of evidence has been gathered, tracked and protected
on its way to a court of law. Chain of Custody (CoC) is not a mandatory step
in forensic analysis. However, it is extensively used as evidences, to be accept-
able in a court or in legal procedures, must be proved to be not altered during
investigations. Thus, a good CoC process should use a standard for dealing and
handling evidences (digital or not), regardless of whether the evidence will be
used in a trial or not.
The main requirements of a CoC process are:
– Integrity: the evidence has not been altered or corrupted during the trans-
ferring.
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– Traceability: the evidence must be traced from the time of its collection
until it is destroyed.
– Authentication: all the entities interacting with an evidence must provide
an irrefutable sign as a recognizable proof of their identity.
– Verifiability: the whole process must be verifiable from every entity in-
volved in the process.
– Security - Tampering proof: Changeovers of an evidence cannot be al-
tered or corrupted.
Currently, CoC process requirements are met by employing a physical han-
dover of evidences where, at each step, documents are filled in and signed in
front of officers. In this paper, we take a step toward the dematerialisation of
this process by proposing a Blockchain-based architecture for CoC of digital
evidences.
Leveraging on the features offered by blockchain technologies, we defined an
architecture able to support the CoC process. In particular, we set up a private
permissioned blockchain and we implemented a smart contract to keep track
of the ownership changes during the evidence lifecycle. We implemented our
prototype on an Ethereum [9] private network and we evaluated the impact of
the system configuration parameters on performance.
2 Background
2.1 Blockchain technology
The blockchain technology implements a decentralized fully replicated append-
only ledger in a peer-to-peer network, originally employed for the Bitcoin cryp-
tocurrency [7]. All participating nodes maintain a full local copy of the block-
chain. The blockchain consists of a sequence of blocks containing the transactions
of the ledger. Transactions inside blocks are sorted chronologically and each block
contains a cryptographic hash of the previous block in the chain. Nodes create
new blocks as they receives transactions, which are broadcast in the network.
Once a block is complete, they start the consensus process to convince other
nodes to include it in the blockchain. In the original blockchain technology em-
ployed in Bitcoin the consensus process is based on Proof-of-Work (PoW) [7].
With PoW nodes compete with each other in confirming transactions and cre-
ating new blocks by solving a mathematical puzzle. While solving a block is a
computational intensive task, verifying its validity is easy. To incentivize such
mechanism, solving a block also results in mining a certain amount of bitcoins,
which is the reward for block creators (usually referred to as miners). Some-
times, more than one miner may generate a valid block thus creating forks in
the chain. Forks are solved by accepting only the longest branch as the valid
continuation of the chain (thus eliminating forks eventually). The main advan-
tage of PoW, over traditional consensus algorithms, is that an attacker would
have to control the majority of the computational power of the network, rather
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than the majority of the nodes, which is considered more difficult and virtually
impossible in public large-scale networks.
The main criticism to PoW is its huge demand of energy, which also prevents
its applicability in certain contexts. This has led to the investigation of alterna-
tive forms of consensus for the blockchain, such as Proof-of-Stake [5]. With PoS,
a set of nodes, called validators, take turns proposing new blocks and voting on
them. Validators put a stake in the network (e.g., a given amount of cryptocur-
rency) and are incentivized to act honestly so as not to lose the stake. Indeed, the
blockchain keeps track of the set of validators, which are ousted if they behave
maliciously (thus losing their stake).
A specific type of PoS is Proof-of-Authority (PoA) in which individual’s iden-
tity (rather than cryptocurrency) is at stake. With PoA validators must have
been preventively authorized and their identities are known. Thus, acting ma-
liciously results in losing personal reputation and ultimately in being expelled
from the validator set.
While PoW is particularly suited for public networks, both PoS and PoA
may be suitable for private networks (where PoW would probably fail short as
it would be much easier to control the majority of the computational power).
Moreover, PoW and PoS can be used in permissionless networks, that is, net-
works where nodes can freely join the network without previous authorization
(e.g., as in Bitcoin and Ethereum). PoA, on the other hand, is typically em-
ployed in permissioned blockchain networks, that is, networks in which nodes
cannot freely join and become validators, but rather they have to be preventively
authorized.
2.2 Ethereum and Smart Contracts
Etherium [9] can be seen as a decentralized virtual machine based on the block-
chain technology. The Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) runs programs, re-
ferred to as smart contracts, whose state is stored in the Ethereum blockchain.
Every node execute a local EVM. When an account wants to execute a function
of a smart contract, it issues a transaction which is broadcast to the network.
Each node executes the transaction on its local EVM and stores it, along with
the new computed state, in the blockchain.
In Ethereum each EVM instruction consumes a virtual resource referred to
as gas. Gas can be seen as the fuel of the EVM and is employed to incentivize
miners to execute transactions and include them in the blockchain. Indeed, for
each transaction, miners are rewarded by the issuer with the payment of fees
proportional to the total amount of gas “consumed” to execute that transaction.
To prevent mined blocks from becoming too large, which may severely impact
block propagation and processing latency, each block has a block gas limit, which
is the maximum amount of gas all transactions included in the block are allowed
to consume. Thus, an issued transaction may not be included in the current
block by a miner because it would exceed the block gas limit. In such case, the
issued transaction would have to wait until the next block creation.
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The public Ethereum blockchain (often referred to simply as “Ethereum”)
is a public permissionless networks which adopts PoW as consensus algorithm
(even though it is planned to switch to PoS in the future). However, all major
Ethereum implementations [1,3] allow to configure many aspects of the protocol,
such as the actual consensus algorithms employed, and allow to build custom
public/private permissionless/permissioned blockchain networks.
2.3 Istanbul BFT consensus protocol
Istanbul Byzantine Fault Tolerance (IBFT) [2] is an adaptation of the Practical
Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) [6] algorithm to serve as a PoA consensus
algorithm for the Ethereum protocol. IBFT can tolerate at most f faulty val-
idators out of a total of n = 3f + 1 validators. The IBFT algorithm proceeds
in rounds with a new block created every T seconds, where the block period T
is a constant configuration parameter. In each round one of the validators is
elected as the proposer. The proposer creates the new block and broadcasts it to
all validators with a pre-prepare message. Upon receiving pre-prepare messages,
validators enter the pre-prepared phase and broadcast prepare messages. This,
ensures that validators are aligned to the same round and block. Upon receiving
2f+1 prepare messages, validators enter the prepared phase and broadcast com-
mit messages to inform other validators that they accept the proposed block.
Finally, upon receiving 2f + 1 commit messages, validators enter the committed
phase and insert the block in the blockchain.
3 System Model
CoC model. A digital evidence (or electronic evidence) is any probative infor-
mation stored or transmitted in digital form that a party may use in a trial to a
court case. Digital evidences are collected by authorised parties (usually police
officers) that become their temporary (first) owners.
For the sake of presentation and without loss of generality, in the following
we will consider a single digital evidence d ev collected by an authorised entity e0
that holds its ownership. During investigations, several authorised entities (e.g.,
police offices, lawyers, judges, magistrates, etc.) may need to access, acquire
and/or own temporarily d ev. The set of authorised entities that can interact
with d ev is denoted with Ad ev. Each authorised entity has a unique identifier
known to all and he/she owns credentials that allows him/her to be authenticated
and take actions in the CoC process.
At each time t, d ev can have just one owner and the owner must belong
to Ad ev. If an authorised entity ei needs to acquire and own d ev, the current
owner needs to issue a transfer request towards ei. The change of ownership
happens if and only if ei ∈ Ad ev and the transfer record is written permanently
in the evidence log.
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Fig. 1. B-CoC architecture.
Network Model. The system is composed by a set of processes p1, p2, . . . , pn,
one for each authorised entity in Ad ev. Each process pi has a pair of private-
public keys that it uses to authenticate itself and to sign messages. Processes are
connected trough a peer-to-peer network (authenticated perfect links).
4 B-CoC Architecture
The Blockchain-based Chain of Custody (B-CoC) architecture proposed in this
paper is based on a private and permissioned blockchain. This choice has been
driven by the authentication requirement of the CoC process that does not allow
unauthorised and untrusted parties to manage digital evidences and thus to be
in the network.
As shown in Figure 1, B-CoC is composed mainly of three components: (i) the
Evidences DB, (ii) the Evidence Log and the (iii) Frontend interface. The Ev-
idence DB is an ordinary database and/or file repository where we store the
actual digital evidences, while CoC related data are stored in the Evidence Log,
which is implemented through the blockchain technology. The reason for this
separation is twofold. First of all, evidences can be too large to be efficiently
stored in the blockchain (for example, an evidence may be a bit-by-bit copy of
a storage device of several TBs of capacity). Secondly, and most importantly, if
evidences were stored in the blockchain, every node in the blockchain network
would have access to them, while only authorized nodes should be allowed to
acquire an evidence. Therefore, we store in the blockchain only the information
regarding the CoC process and an hash of the evidence which allows to verify
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evidences integrity during acquisition.
Evidence DB. The Evidences DB is an ordinary database and/or file repos-
itory where the original digital evidence is stored along with an identifier ID,
obtained as the hash of the evidence and a nonce (to guarantee uniqueness of
IDs). This database is distributed and is managed by trusted entities (e.g., law
court officers). Moreover, each access is executed only if the requesting entity is
authorized to perform such access according to its role.
Evidence Log. The Evidence Log is implemented trough the blockchain tech-
nology and stores, for each evidence, its ID, a description, the identity of the
submitter (which we call creator) and the complete history of owners up to the
current one, including the time at which changes of ownership occurred. Note
that while the evidence itself is not stored in the blockchain, the ID allows to
verify that the evidence has not been tampered with, provided that a robust
cryptographic hash function is used to generate it.
The evidence log is implemented on top of a peer-to-peer network composed
by all authorised entities. Such network can be decomposed in two sets of nodes:
– Validator nodes: they have mainly the following functionalities: (i) storing a
copy of the blockchain, (ii) validating transactions and (iii) create, propose
and add blocks to the chain (i.e., participate to the consensus protocol).
This is the set of nodes that must be preventively authorized with the role
of validators in the permissioned blockchain.
– Lightweight nodes: they can be seen as clients of the chain since they simply
issue transactions and need to rely on validators for adding and validating
their transactions.
Taking Italy as a use case, each validator may correspond to the main coordi-
nator of the court of one of the 20 regional capitals. Lightweight nodes, instead,
would represent all the other involved parties such as police departments, foren-
sic investigators, forensic consultants and so on. The Evidence Log runs a smart
contract which exposes four primitives (see Figure 1):
– CreateEvidence(ID, description): stores a new evidence entry in the
blockchain with the specified ID and description, setting the submitter
identity as the creator and current owner of the evidence.
– Transfer(ID, newowner): transfers the ownership of an evidence (register-
ing the handover). It fails if the issuer is not the current owner.
– RemoveEvidence(ID): removes an evidence entry. It fails if the issuer is not
the creator.
– GetEvidence(ID): returns the information in the evidence entry. Namely,
the ID, description, creator and all owners with the time of each change of
ownership.
Implementation details of the Evidence Log and the smart contract are discussed
in Section 5.
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Frontend Interface. The frontend represents the interface between B-CoC
and its users. A local instance runs on each node and interacts with the Evi-
dences DB and the Evidence Log (through a local blockchain node). When an
authorized user submits a new digital evidence d ev to the system, he/she takes
the role of creator of d ev (see Figure 1). The frontend generates the ID for
d ev using a nonce n, stores (ID, n, d ev) in the Evidence DB and issues the
CreateEvidence() transaction in the Evidence Log. As already discussed the
submitter is also registered as the first owner in the blockchain.
The creator of an evidence d ev can request to discard it from the sys-
tem (e.g., because it is no more legally valid). If he/she is authorized to do
so, the corresponding entry is removed from the Evidence Log by issuing the
RemoveEvidence() transaction. If the transaction succeeds, the corresponding
evidence is deleted from the Evidence DB.
When a user wants to acquire an evidence d ev, the Frontend sends a request
to the Evidences DB which will serve the request only if the user is the current
owner of d ev. This check is performed by interacting with the Evidence Log.
The change of ownership of an evidence d ev is performed by issuing a
Transfer() transaction specifying the new owner.
Finally, every user in the B-CoC network can query the Evidence Log to
get the entry of an evidence (which contains all relevant information except the
evidence itself). This is performed by simply issuing the GetEvidence().
5 Evidence Log Implementation
As described in Section 4, B-CoC Evidence Log is designed as a private and
permissioned blockchain. The blockchain infrastructure is implemented through
Geth [1] a popular implementation of a full Ethereum node. Geth allows to setup
a private network and configure all aspects of the blockchain and the consensus
protocol employed. Given the design of a private permissioned blockchain we
adopt a PoA-based consensus. Namely, the IBFT consensus protocol described
in Section 2.3. On top of this blockchain infrastructure, we run a smart contract
implementing the CoC process. The implementation of B-CoC Evidence Log
involves three steps: (i) the initialization of the private blockchain, (ii) the cre-
ation of the private network and (iii) the creation and deployment of the smart
contract.
5.1 Private chain initialization
The setup of a new blockchain involves the creation of its genesis block. This
is the first block of a blockchain and contains the initial parameters. The only
configuration parameters that are of interest for the purposes of the following
discussion are:
– Block Period T : the block period of the IBFT consensus algorithm (see
section 2.3);
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– Block Gas Limit G: Maximum amount of gas transactions in a block are
allowed to consume (see section 2.2);
– Validators: The Ethereum addresses of the pre-authorized validators.
The genesis block is used to initialize each node of the network.
5.2 Private network setup
First of all, to build the private peer-to-peer network we need to setup the peer
discovery service to allow new nodes to enter the network and know other nodes.
This is accomplished with the bootnode tool (of the Geth tools suite). This
tool allows to run special nodes (with known IP addresses) that validators and
lightweight nodes will contact when first started to exchange peer information.
Validators and lightweight nodes are Geth nodes. First, we configure the set
of validators (which is fixed and known in advance) with the genesis block and
we run them through the geth command (of the Geth tools suite). Validators
are created once at the beginning and they never leave the network, unless they
act maliciously and are expelled. Lightweight nodes, instead, can be created and
join/leave the network at any time. They are created with the geth tool as well,
but their addresses are not included in the genesis block.
5.3 Smart contract implementation
The smart contract has been implemented through the Solidity contract-oriented
programming language [4]. Due to space constraints, the code of the smart con-
tract is reported in the Appendix. The smart contract manages entries associated
to digital evidences (i.e., the entries of the Evidence Log). Each Evidence entry
(lines 3-10) consists of the ID, the Ethereum address of the creator, the ad-
dress of the owner, a string field to store the description of the evidence and
two arrays taddr and ttime that store, respectively, the evidence handovers
and the times at which they occurred. These arrays are chronologically sorted
from the creator to the current owner. All evidence items are stored in a map
indexed by evidence IDs (line 12). The smart contract has a total of four func-
tions implementing the primitives of the Evidence Log described in Section 4.
The CreateEvidence(ID, description) function creates a new Evidence en-
try with the specified ID and description, and the address of the related trans-
action sender as the creator and current owner of the evidence (line 31). The
Transfer(ID, newowner) function transfers the ownership of the evidence iden-
tified by ID to the entity identified by the address newowner (line 40). Note that
only the current owner of an evidence can transfer ownership (OnlyOwner mod-
ifier). The RemoveEvidence(ID) function removes an evidence from the map
of evidences (line 46). No further operations can be performed on a removed
evidence. Note that only the creator of an evidence can remove the evidence
(OnlyCreator modifier). The GetEvidence(ID) function returns all fields of an
evidence entry (line 51).
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Table 1. Size and gas used by each transaction.
TX size(TX) (bytes) gas(TX) (units)
CreateEvidence(0) 207 170207
· · · · · · · · ·
CreateEvidence(1024) 1233 897367
Transfer() 174 80502
RemoveEvidence() 142 236478
Note that while calling the first three functions results in issuing transactions
to the blockchain that modify the state of the smart contract, the GetEvidence
function only returns an entry and does not modify the state. In the context of
the Solidity language these are called constant functions or views. Calling views
does not result in the issuing of transactions, but rather they are executed locally
by the node’s local EVM.
6 Evaluation
In this section we evaluate how the parameters of B-CoC, namely the block
period T and the block gas limit G, affect its performance. Section 6.1 reports
an analysis of the transaction latency, Section 6.2 evaluates the space overhead
due to block headers and Section 6.3 discusses the growth rate of the blockchain.
Notation. In the following sections we will use the notation TX to refer to a
transaction type (i.e., a non-constant function of a smart contract) and tx to refer
to an execution of a transaction. For example, TX may refer to the transaction
type Transfer(), while tx may refer to an actual execution of a Transfer() of
an evidence. We will use gas(tx) and size(tx) to indicate, respectively, the gas
consumed by the execution of a transaction tx and the size (in bytes) of tx when
included in a block. Note that, in general, both gas(tx) and size(tx) depend on
the particular execution of tx. In practice, for our smart contract, transaction
types Transfer() and RemoveEvidence() have constant size and gas used, while
for CreateEvidence() such parameters depend exclusively on the length ` of
the description parameter. Thus, for ease of presentation we will consider
a different transaction type CreateEvidence(`) for each value of `. Since we
limit the length of the description parameter to 1024 characters, we consider
1025 different transaction types (` = 0, . . . , 1025). Thus, each transaction type
has constant size and constant consumed gas and, therefore, we will consider
size(TX) = size(tx) where tx is an execution of TX and use the two members
of the equation interchangeably, as well as gas(TX) = gas(tx). We will refer to
SC = {TX1, . . . , TXn} as the set of transaction types of the smart contract.
Table 1 reports the size and gas of the transaction types in our smart contract.
Due to space constraints Table 1 only shows CreateEvidence(`) for ` = 0 and
` = 1024, but the size and gas used by such transaction types increase with `.
10 S. Bonomi et al.
6.1 Transaction latency
The transaction latency L(tx) = LB(tx) + LC(b) is the time elapsed from the
issue of the transaction to its inclusion in the blockchain. It is the sum of the
block inclusion latency LB(tx), that is the time required by tx to be included in
a block b of the current proposer, and the consensus latency LC(b), which is the
time required to reach consensus on block b and include it in the blockchain: In
the next two sections we will analyze these two terms separately.
Block inclusion latency The block inclusion latency LB(tx) is the time re-
quired for a transaction tx to be included in a block. Indeed, whenever a new
transaction is issued it may not fit in the block of the current proposer due to
the block gas limit G. In such case, the transaction is reissued in the next block
period.
More formally, let block(tx) be the block in which, eventually, transaction
tx is included, and time(tx), time(b) be, respectively, the time at which tx is
issued and the time at which a block b was created (i.e., the beginning of b’s
block period), then:
LB(tx) = time(block(tx)) + T − time(tx) (1)
where T is the block period.
The block inclusion latency is affected by the block period parameter T , the
gas limit G and the workload, i.e., the rate of transactions issued to the sys-
tem in the unit of time. Suppose that we are able to precisely characterize the
workload the system is subject to and to set G such that every issued transac-
tion is included in the block of the current proposer. In such ideal conditions,
LB(tx) ∈ [0, T ]. That is, the maximum block inclusion latency is the block pe-
riod T . Clearly, setting G =∞ would meet the ideal conditions for every possible
workload volume, but on the other side would negatively impact consensus la-
tency, as blocks could increase indefinitely (see next section). Thus, we would
like to set G as small as possible (to reduce consensus latency), but large enough
so that (at least on average) every transaction is included in the block of the
current proposer. Thus the ideal value of G depends on the workload. However,
rather than the number of transactions per seconds, it depends on the gas rate,
i.e., the amount of gas consumed by the transactions issued in a given block
period. Indeed, the minimum value of G that guarantees the ideal conditions for
the block inclusion latency is the maximum gas rate.
Figure 2 shows the results of three experiments that confirm the previous
claim. In each experiment we set a different value of the block gas limit (G1, G2
G3) and we progressively increased the gas rate from the start to the end of the
experiment. From the figure we can clearly see that, in each experiment, when the
gas rate is less than or equal to the gas limit the average block inclusion latency
is approximately equal to the expected value of T/2 (because transactions are
issued uniformly distributed in each block period) while the maximum latency
is T (not shown in the figure). However, as soon as the gas rate exceeds the
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Fig. 2. Mean block inclusion latency varying the gas rate, i.e., the amount of gas
consumed by transactions in a block period.
block gas limit the average block inclusion latency starts increasing indefinitely
as expected.
This analysis provides a lower bound for the value of the block gas limit (i.e.,
the maximum gas rate), that allows to minimize the maximum block inclusion
latency to T . However, determining such value may be difficult. Appendix B
reports a more general and detailed discussion on setting the parameters of B-
CoC.
Consensus latency Given the consensus protocol described in section 2.3, the
consensus latency, i.e., the time required to propagate a block b between the
validators and reach consensus, can be approximated by the formula LC(b) ≈
sPP(b)+sP+sC
R , where sPP(b) is the size of the pre-prepare message, sP is the size of
the prepare message, sC is the size of the commit message and R is the bandwidth
of the slowest communication channel between two validators nodes (bytes/sec).
While sP and sC are constant, the pre-prepare message piggybacks the block b
and thus sPP(b) depends on size(b). Since R is typically a constant that depends
on the infrastructure connecting the validator nodes, the only factor that we can
adjust to control the latency is the size of a block.
The size of a block is the sum of the size of the transactions in it plus the size
of the block header sH (which is constant). In our prototype implementation of
B-CoC, sH = 1909 bytes. The actual number and type of transactions in a block
depends on many factors, including the block period T , the block gas limit G
and ultimately the particular set of transactions sent during a given time period.
Thus, in general, different blocks have different sizes. However, we can control
the maximum block size Smax, and thus the maximum consensus latency LmaxC ,
by adjusting the block gas limit G.
For a given value of G, the maximum block size Smax can be computed by
solving the following optimization problem:
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Problem 1 (UKP).
maximize
∑
TXi∈SC
size(TXi) · xi
subject to
∑
TXi∈SC
gas(TXi) · xi ≤ G
xi ∈ N, i = 1, . . . , n
where xi is the number of times a transaction of type TXi appears in the block
of maximum size. The optimal solution {x∗1, . . . , x∗n} leads to the maximum block
size:
Smax = sH + OPTUKP(G) = sH +
∑
TXi∈SC
size(TXi) · x∗i
Problem 1 is an instance of the well-known unbounded knapsack problem [8],
where transaction types correspond to the items to fit in the knapsack, while
transactions’ size and consumed gas correspond, respectively, to items’ value and
weight. The block gas limit parameter G corresponds to the knapsack maximum
weight.
While the general unbounded knapsack problem is NP-hard (with time com-
plexity O(nG)), this particular instance turns out to be trivial. Indeed, it is easy
to see that Transfer() dominates all other transaction types [8]. That is, given
any block containing at least a transaction tx of type in SC \ {Transfer()},
we can always replace tx with a sufficient number of Transfer() so as to
obtain a better solution to Problem 1. For example, we can always replace a
transaction of type RemoveEvidence() with a single Transfer() and obtain
a solution that consumes less gas but have larger size. The same occurs if
we replace CreateEvidence(0) with 2 Transfer(), or CreateEvidence(1024)
with at least 8 Transfer(). This implies that the optimal solution of this
instance of the unbounded knapsack problem corresponds to a block consist-
ing of only Transfer() transactions. Therefore, let gT = gas(Transfer()),
sT = size(Transfer()), the solution is simply given by:
Smax = sH +
⌊
G
gT
⌋
· sT (2)
Note that Smax cannot be an arbitrary integer, but only one such that Smax =
sH + k · sT, k ∈ N. Once chosen the appropriate value of Smax (one that allows
to limit the maximum consensus latency to an acceptable bound), G can be set
to any value such that:
G =
Smax − sH
sT
· gT + r = k · gT + r, r = 0, . . . , gT − 1 (3)
Equations 2 and 3 allows to determine an upper-bound for G so as to bound the
maximum consensus latency LmaxC . A more general discussion on how to properly
set B-CoC’s parameters is reported in Appendix B.
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6.2 Block headers overhead
As discussed in section 6.1, the block period T affects transactions block inclusion
latency. A longer block period implies higher latency. On the other hand, a
shorter period results in a higher number of blocks created per time interval
(since a block for each block period is created). Since each block has a fixed size
header, the larger the number of blocks created, the higher the space occupied
by block headers compared to transactions in the blockchain, that is, the higher
the space overhead.
The headers size overhead, i.e., the total size of block headers, at any time t
is:
OH(t) = sH · t
T
(4)
Note that this value only depends on the number of blocks in the chain at time
t, and not on the number of transactions. Figure 3 shows the space overhead
per year (sH = 1909 bytes in our prototype implementation), that is, how much
blockchain’s space is taken up by block headers every year. For example, for
T = 5 minutes the space overhead is around 191 MB per year. We find this value
of T a good trade-off between transaction latency and block headers overhead
for this particular application of the blockchain.
6.3 Blockchain growth rate
The blockchain can be seen as an append-only database. That is, its size cannot
shrink over time. If ISC(t) is the set of transactions included in the blockchain
at time t, then the blockchain total size at time t is:
sizebc(t) = sg + overheadbc(t) +
∑
tx∈ISC(t)
size(tx)
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Table 2. Growth rate for different classes of workloads (n CreateEvidence(1024), n
RemoveEvidence(), 10n Transfer() per year).
Workload GR−OH GR with T = 5′ OH /GR (%)
n = 10000 29.7 MB/year 221.08 MB/year 86.56%
n = 100000 297 MB/year 488.45 MB/year 39.18%
n = 1000000 2.9 GB/year 3.09 GB/year 6.05%
where sg is the size of the genesis block. Therefore, the growth rate over a time
interval [t1, t2] is sizebc(t2)− sizebc(t1), that is:
GR(t1; t2) = sH · t2 − t1
T
+
∑
tx∈ISC(t1;t2)
size(tx) (5)
where ISC(t1; t2) = ISC(t2) \ ISC(t1).
Obviously, how fast a blockchain grows over time depends mainly on the
transaction rate. Another factor that affects the growth rate is the block pe-
riod T . As already shown in section 6.2, this parameter affects the headers over-
head and thus the first term of equation 5. The block gas limit parameter G
may also affect the growth rate, as, if not properly dimensioned, it may increase
latency spreading the incoming transaction rate over a larger time period, thus,
decreasing the growth rate (i.e., G would affect the number and type of transac-
tions included in ISC(t1; t2) and thus the second term of equation 5). However,
the analysis detailed in section 6.1, should allow to set the value of G so as to
bound transaction latency. In practice, G should be set greater than the average
gas rate to avoid an ever increasing latency. In this conditions, if the growth rate
is computed over a large enough interval of time (to hide the effects of poten-
tial peak gas rate periods), the block gas limit parameter should not affect the
growth rate significantly (that is, if properly set, G should not affect ISC(t1; t2)).
Otherwise, G should be set to a larger value.
By using equation 5 we computed the annual growth rate for different classes
of workloads. Since we were not able to find any publicly available statistics
about evidence collection and transfer, we considered different classes of syn-
thetic workloads with n new evidence creations and removals and 10n transfers
per year. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 2. The second column
of Table 2 reports the annual growth rate without considering the headers size
overhead, while the third one includes the overhead term computed for T = 5′.
Finally, the fourth column shows the overhead percentages. Even in presence
of a very large number of evidence collection (1 million per year) and transfers
(10 millions per year) the growth rate is around 3 GB per year, which seems
acceptable given the capacities of todays storage devices.
7 Conclusion
This paper presented B-CoC, a blockchain-based architecture to dematerialise
the CoC process in digital forensics. We also provided a prototype of the B-CoC
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architecture based on the Geth implementation of Ethereum nodes. Based on the
performance evaluation, B-CoC showed to be an effective support for the CoC
process as it is able to sustain realistic workload with an acceptable overhead in
terms of memory used to store the chain.
The current implementation assumes that the set of validators node is fixed
and that validators are available to sacrifice their privacy when participating in
the consensus process. As a future work, we are investigating how it is possible
to manage a dynamic set of validators and most important we are studying
alternatives that allow to increase the level of privacy for validators not altering
other dependability and security attributes.
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Appendix
A Smart Contract Code
1 pragma solidity ^0.4.22;
2 contract ChainOfCustody {
3 struct Evidence {
4 bytes32 ID;
5 address owner;
6 address creator;
7 string description;
8 address [] taddr;
9 uint[] ttime;
10 }
11
12 mapping(bytes32 => Evidence) private evidences;
13
14 modifier OnlyOwner(bytes32 ID) {
15 require(msg.sender == evidences[ID].owner);
16 _;
17 }
18 modifier OnlyCreator(bytes32 ID) {
19 require(msg.sender == evidences[ID]. creator);
20 _;
21 }
22 modifier EvidenceExists(bytes32 ID, bool mustExist) {
23 bool exists = evidences[ID].ID != 0x0;
24 if (mustExist)
25 require(ID != 0x0 && exists);
26 else
27 require (! exists);
28 _;
29 }
30 function CreateEvidence (bytes32 ID, string description)
31 public EvidenceExists(ID, false) {
32 evidences[ID].ID = ID;
33 evidences[ID]. owner = msg.sender;
34 evidences[ID]. creator = msg.sender;
35 evidences[ID]. description = description;
36 evidences[ID]. taddr.push(msg.sender);
37 evidences[ID]. ttime.push(now);
38 }
39 function Transfer(bytes32 ID, address newowner)
40 public OnlyOwner(ID) EvidenceExists(ID, true) {
41 evidences[ID]. owner = newowner;
42 evidences[ID]. taddr.push(newowner);
43 evidences[ID]. ttime.push(now);
44 }
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45 function RemoveEvidence(bytes32 ID)
46 public OnlyCreator(ID) EvidenceExists(ID, true) {
47 delete evidences[ID];
48 }
49 function GetEvidence(bytes32 ID)
50 view public returns(bytes32 , address , address ,
51 string , address [], uint []) {
52 return(evidences[ID].ID, evidences[ID].owner ,
53 evidences[ID].creator , evidences[ID]. description ,
54 evidences[ID].taddr , evidences[ID]. ttime);
55 }
56 }
Listing A.1. Smart contract code.
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B Discussion on the configuration of the parameters
Section 6 discusses how the parameters of B-CoC affect its performance with
respect to different aspects, namely the transaction latency, the block headers
overhead and the blockchain growth rate. Here we give a comprehensive discus-
sion on how to set B-CoC parameters.
B.1 Setting the block period T
The block period T affects transactions block inclusion latency (see section 6.1)
and the block headers overhead (section 6.2), that ultimately affects the block-
chain growth rate. As already discussed in section 6.2, a shorter block period
results in a lower maximum block inclusion latency, but also in a higher block
header overhead. To find the best trade-off one can use equation 4. For example,
with our prototype implementation of B-CoC we consider T = 5′ to be a good
trade-off between latency and block header overhead. Indeed, any further in-
crease of T would result in a small improvement in terms of overhead reduction
compared to the increase of latency (as shown in Figure 3).
B.2 Setting the block gas limit G
The block gas limit affects both term of the transaction latency. In particular in
section 6.1, we describe an analysis that allows to derive a lower bound GL for
G, to limit block inclusion latency and an upper bound GU to limit consensus
latency.
When GL ≤ GU it is safe to set G equal to any value in [GL, GU] to obtain
a maximum block inclusion latency bound by T and the desired maximum con-
sensus latency. On the other hand, if GL > GU, it is not possible to have both
terms of transaction latencies bounded by the desired values. In such case, one
should set G to the best trade-off between block inclusion latency and consensus
latency. A good strategy may be to discard the lower bound GL in favor of a new
lower bound GavgL which is set to the average gas rate rather than the maximum
gas rate. Setting G = GavgL would result in block inclusion latency bounded by T
on average, with possible periods of increasing latencies, e.g., during peak loads.
In this case, if GavgL ≤ GU one should set G = GU, otherwise G = GavgL . Indeed,
setting a value of G less than the average gas rate would result in ever increasing
transaction latencies.
